

Paulo Fagandini

Phone: +351 910 612 954
Skype: paulo.fagandini
URL: www.pfagandini.eu
Born: March 26th, 1986 – Viña del Mar, Chile
Citizenship: Chilean / Italian

Nova School of Business and Economics
Campus Campolide
1099-032 Lisbon
Portugal

Areas of specialization

Corporate Finance Theory, Industrial Organization, Contract Theory, Matching, Auctions.

Appointments

2013-present	Teaching Assistant, Nova SBE, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
2008- 2010	Teaching Assistant, Economics Department, Universidad de Chile.

Education

2018(Exp)	Ph.D. in Economics, Nova SBE, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. <i>Dissertation: "Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory".</i> <i>Advisors: Steffen Hoernig (main) and Guido Maretto.</i>
2014	Master of Research in Economics, Nova SBE, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
2011	Bachelor of Science in Economics, FEN, Universidad de Chile.

Other Education

2017	Summer School: "Liquidity in Financial Markets and Institutions", FTG, Olin Business School.
Fall 2016	Visiting Ph.D. Student, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles.
2015	Workshop: "Pedagogical Training for College Teachers", Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

Grants, honors & awards

Grants and Scholarships

2015-2018	Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Doctoral Grant: SFRH/BD/105669/2015.
2011- 2015	Nova SBE Scholarship for merit (Partial tuition waiver).

Conference Chairs

2017	UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications. Session: Matching II.
2016	ASSET Annual Meeting 2016. Session: Asymmetric Information I.

Conferences and Seminars

- 2017 | UECE Lisbon Meetings, Lisbon PT(*); Nova Doctoral School, UNL, Lisbon PT;
IRW, Nova SBE, Lisbon PT; RG, Nova SBE, Lisbon PT.
- 2016 | QEDJ 2016, Amsterdam NE; ASSET Annual Meeting 2016, Thessaloniki GR(*).
(*) Peer Reviewed.

Articles

Fagandini, P. "Wealth and the Principal-Agent Matching". **JOB MARKET PAPER**.

ABSTRACT: I study the role that the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Since utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized increasing differences and find that wealthier agents indeed match with bigger firms, when talent is homogeneous among them, while for equally wealthy agents, more talented agents match with bigger firms. I describe economic conditions over types such that pairs of higher types will write contracts in which the agent obtains more than the information rents, through a higher bonus, increasing the expected surplus. Finally, I provide an example in which wealth is distributed among agents in such a way that it reverses the standard result of positive assortative matching between talent and firm size.

Fagandini, P. "Hunting with two bullets; A Moral Hazard problem".

ABSTRACT: I study the moral hazard problem where an agent can create an extra instance to exert effort, and potentially improve bad realizations of the outcome before the principal observes it. Here the agent cannot hide the outcome of his effort, but just the way he achieved it. I find that both, principal and agent, value the option of improving the outcome in case of a bad realization if doing so is cheap. I also find that, under asymmetric information, that contracted effort is not always decreasing in its cost, and that the principal will demand higher returns to contract high effort in every period when compared to the first best. Finally, I let the principal to eliminate, by using deadlines, the agent's extra chance. I find that, under a broad range of scenarios, the principal will shorten deadlines if preventing an agent's deviation from the optimal strategy is too expensive.

Fagandini, P. and Dierickx, I. "Bidding in First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: A Computational Approach".

ABSTRACT: Computational methods are used to analyze bidding in first price sealed bid auctions for a broad range of realistic scenarios. Bidders' valuations may have both common value and firm-specific components, and the accuracy of their estimates of the common value component may differ. Also, we allow for a subset of "naive" bidders, defined as bidders who do not account for the Winner's Curse. We find that, when estimates are independently distributed, bids can be determined by applying a constant Shading Factor that can be computed ex-ante of receiving a signal. Our computations confirm that these bids are very sensitive to asymmetries in the bidding population and, in particular, to the presence of naive bidders. Assuming that a rival is rational when in fact he is naive results in underbidding when facing that rival only and in overbidding in all other cases.

Teaching

2013-2018	<u>Nova SBE</u> B.Sc. (TA): Macroeconomics, Industrial Economics, Advanced Microeconomics. M.Sc. (Grader): Organization and Incentives, Economics of Regulation.
2008-2010	<u>University of Chile</u> B.Sc. (TA): Macroeconomics I and Macroeconomics II. B.Sc. (Head TA): Introduction to Macroeconomics and Macroeconomics I.

Other Professional Experience

2014-2015	Senior Consultant at I.D. Consulting Limited.
2011	Trainee Program at Pro-Chile Milano, Directorate of Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
2011	Intern at the Financial Stability Division, Central Bank of Chile.
2009	Intern at the Credit Risk Group, Central Bank of Chile.

Other Skills

Computer: Linux Mint, Matlab, Java, Mathematica, LaTeX, MS Office, MS Windows, and Mac OS/OSX.

Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent), Portuguese (fluent), Italian (fluent), French (basic).

Referee For

Information Economics and Policy.

References

Steffen Hoernig, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Economics
Nova SBE
mail: shoernig@novasbe.pt

Fernando Anjos, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Finance
Nova SBE
mail: fernando.anjos@novasbe.pt

Ingemar Dierickx, Ph.D.
Managing Partner
I.D. Consulting Ltd.
mail: ingemar.dierickx@idconsulting.nz

Guido Maretto, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Strategy
Nova SBE
mail: guido@novasbe.pt